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CRIMINOLOGY
INTIMACY AND VIOLENCE: EXPLORING
THE ROLE OF VICTIM-DEFENDANT
RELATIONSHIP IN CRIMINAL LAW
MYRNA DAWSON*
A review of the sociological and criminological literature on victim-
defendant relationship and violence reveals common perspectives or
assumptions about intimate violence. A careful examination of these
assumptions reveals that they support another common assumption-that
the courts treat (and should treat) intimate violence more leniently than
violence between those who share more distant relationships. However,
criminal justice researchers have yet to systematically examine the validity
of these assumptions or the role they play in determining outcomes in
violent crime. Using the focal concerns framework, ten perspectives are
described and linked to various explanations for criminal justice leniency in
cases of intimate violence. An exploratory analysis of one assumption
highlights the need for future research to examine the validity of common
assumptions as well as their impact on court outcomes in cases of violence.
* Please direct all comments to Myrna Dawson, Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 (e-mail:
mdawson@uoguelph.ca). Special thanks to the anonymous reviewers and the editorial staff
at the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for their helpful comments and feedback.
Myrna Dawson is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology
at the University of Guelph, Ontario. Her research focuses on trends and patterns in violence
as well as social and legal responses to violent victimization, specifically intimate partner
violence. Some of her recent publications appear in Law & Society Review, The British
Journal of Criminology, Social Problems, The Sociological Quarterly, and Justice
Quarterly. Her current research examines how three decades of social change experienced
by Canadian women may be contributing to changing patterns in violent victimization and
how the implementation of specialized or "problem-solving" courts may be transforming the
organizational culture of legal and service professionals in the Canadian criminal justice
system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The degree of intimacy that exists between victims and defendants has
traditionally been seen as a major explanatory variable in determining
criminal justice outcomes in cases of violent crime.1 Typically, it is argued
that intimate violence and, in particular, violence between intimate partners,
is treated more leniently by the courts than crimes between those who share
more distant relationships.2 Even though numerous legislative and policy
changes have occurred in recent decades to respond to intimate violence, it
is still commonly assumed that these acts are treated more leniently than
non-intimate violence by criminal justice actors. This belief has persisted
despite the lack of consistent empirical support for an association between
intimacy and law.3 As a result, one might argue, as Hagan and O'Donnel
1 DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 40-48 (1976); MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON &
DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (Law, Society, and Policy Series vol. 3, 2d ed., Joel Fienberg et al.
eds., 1988).
2 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 1, at 40-48; DONALD BLACK, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
RIGHT AND WRONG 70-72 (1993); ALLAN V. HORWITZ, THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CONTROL
(1990); Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and the Domestic Discount, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 224, 235-43 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds.,
1994) [hereinafter Rapaport, The Domestic Discount]; Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death
Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 367, 378 (1991) [hereinafter
Rapaport, Gender Discrimination].
3 For a review of literature, see Myrna Dawson, Rethinking the Boundaries of Intimacy at
the End of the Century: The Role of Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal Justice
Decisionmaking over Time, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 105, 106-09 (2004). Some bivariate
studies have found that victim-defendant relationship is associated with criminal justice
outcomes leading to leniency in cases of intimate violence. See GOTTFREDSON &
GOTTFREDSON, supra note 1; HENRY P. LUNDSGAARDE, MURDER IN SPACE CITY: A
CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSTON HOMICIDE PATTERNS 143-67 (1977); VERA INST. OF
JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S
COURTS (1977). On the other hand, some findings in multivariate analyses have not
consistently supported such a relationship. For example, some studies support the bivariate
research. See, e.g., Kristen M. Williams, The Effects of Victim Characteristics on the
Disposition of Violent Crimes, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 177, 204 (William F.
McDonald ed., 1976); Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim Participation
in Sentencing on Sentence Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 464, 467 (1990); Terance
Miethe, Stereotypical Conceptions and Criminal Processing: The Case of the Victim-
Offender Relationship, 4 JUST. Q. 571, 589 (1987). Yet, Julia Homey and Cassia Spohn
found no association between victim-defendant relationship and the allocation of criminal
sanctions. Julia Homey & Cassia Spohn, The Influence of Blame and Believability Factors
on the Processing of Simple Versus Aggravated Rape Cases, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 135, 150
(1996); see, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial
Discretion, 38 SoC. PROBS. 247, 258, 260 (1991); Martha A. Myers, Offended Parties and
Official Reactions: Victims and the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants, 20 Soc. Q. 529, 537
(1979), Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 781, 793 (1979); Leonore M.J. Simon, Legal Treatment of the Victim-
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have with respect to gender and sentencing, that the perceived criminal
justice leniency toward intimate violence has become part of conventional
criminological and sociological wisdom.4 In other words, it may be that
sociologists and citizens alike assume that those who victimize intimates
are less cold-blooded, less rational, less dangerous, and, in sum, less
blameworthy, for example, than those who victimize non-intimates. These
assumptions may also lead one to believe that defendants who victimize
intimates are, and should be, treated more leniently by the courts than those
who share more distant relationships with their victims. This may also
explain the lack of systematic and empirical research that has focused on
the association between intimacy and law, compared to the abundance of
research that has examined the effect of other variables on criminal justice
outcomes such as gender, race and age.'
Focusing on intimate partner violence, this paper addresses three key
research questions that follow from the above: (1) Do commonly-held
assumptions, beliefs, or stereotypes distinguish between intimate partner
and non-intimate partner violence?6 (2) Can these assumptions, beliefs, or
stereotypes be used to justify more lenient treatment of intimate partner
compared to non-intimate partner violence by criminal justice actors? (3) If
assumptions, beliefs, or stereotypes do exist about intimacy and violence,
are they valid? From this point forward, I will refer to each of the
assumptions, beliefs, or stereotypes discussed as "perspectives," which
Offender Relationship in Crimes of Violence, 11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94, 104
(1996). In addition, conclusions are difficult because studies vary in the type of crime
examined (violent or non-violent) and the stage of the criminal process that is focused upon.
4 John Hagan & Nancy O'Donnel, Sexual Stereotyping and Judicial Sentencing: A Legal
Test of the Sociological Wisdom, 3 CANADIAN J. Soc. 309, 310 (1978).
5 For reviews, see MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA (1995); Kathleen Daly & Rebecca L. Bordt, Sex Effects and Sentencing: An
Analysis of the Statistical Literature, 12 JUST. Q. 141 (1995); Darrell Steffensmeier, John
Kramer & Jeffery Ulmer, Age Differences in Sentencing, 12 JUST. Q. 583 (1995) [hereinafter
Steffensmeier, Kramer & Ulmer, Age Differences]; Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer &
John Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The
Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 763 (1998) [hereinafter
Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, Interaction of Race].
6 Intimate partner violence is defined as acts that occur between victims and defendants
who were or are legally married, common-law partners or dating. Non-intimate partner
violence includes acts between other family members, friends, acquaintances and strangers.
It is acknowledged that both categories-"intimate partner" and "non-intimate partner"-
include a variety of relationships. However, the small sample size precludes further
comparisons. For the purpose of this analysis, though, I argue that intimate partner violence
comprises acts that are the most closely associated with violence commonly typified as




refers to an individual's mental view of facts, ideas, etc., and their
interrelationships. 7  My primary objective is to address the first two
questions. In the next section, I outline the dominant perspectives that can
be found in the literature about intimacy and violence, demonstrating how
each can be used to support the belief that criminal justice actors should
treat defendants who victimize intimate partners more leniently than other
types of defendants. As a second objective, I examine one perspective to
assess whether this characteristic does actually differentiate between
intimate partner and non-intimate partner violence. In short, my aim is to
assess its validity. The decision to focus on one particular perspective was
largely due to the availability of data, often an obstacle when attempting to
capture measures that will allow for a systematic examination of prevailing
perspectives on violence. It is hoped that this brief, exploratory
examination and the description of how it was conducted will serve as an
impetus for future research. Such research can begin to collect the more
detailed data required to assess the validity of other perspectives about
intimacy and violence that are outlined in detail below.
To clarify, then, this is not an examination of how perspectives about
intimacy and violence do affect criminal justice decision-making; rather it is
a study of how they may be central to criminal justice decision-making,
warranting further examination by social science researchers. I argue that
examining their validity is important given that, during the past several
decades, increasing attention has been paid to the integral role of
"stereotyping" in criminal justice decision-making and the subsequent
consequences it may have for case dispositions. Few scholars, however,
have assessed the validity of the varying perspectives that might underscore
stereotypical thinking. Avenues for future research that examine the actual
role played by these perspectives in criminal justice decision-making are
discussed in the conclusion. Below, I use the focal concerns framework to
organize the discussion.
7 Ethnomethodologists refer to them as "folk typifications" that are used by people,
regardless of their level of education or occupational training. For example, using such a
classification process, Lundman found that police tend to categorize situations in the
following way: cases that require real police work and pose a significant threat, and those
that do not. RICHARD J. LUNDMAN, POLICE AND POLICING: AN INTRODUCTION (1980); see
also David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 SoC. PROBS. 255, 275 (1965) (discussing "normal" crimes).
8 Miethe, supra note 3, at 571-72.
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II. FOCAL CONCERNS, INTIMACY AND VIOLENCE
The common perspectives about intimacy 9 and violence highlighted in
this paper are organized around three focal concerns emphasized by judges
and other criminal justice decision-makers when responding to criminal
behavior: (1) defendant culpability; (2) protection of the public; and (3) the
practical constraints of the criminal justice system.)0 In the next several
sections, I describe these focal concerns and discuss the perspectives that
relate to each. While one perspective may be applicable to more than one
concern, each is couched within a particular category. Despite some
overlap, the perspective is sufficiently distinct to justify a separate
discussion, drawing from a particular body of literature. Each perspective
is then linked to a specific explanation for criminal justice leniency in cases
of intimate partner violence.l While this discussion may not provide an
exhaustive list, it does comprise the dominant perspectives that exist in the
literature about intimacy and violent crime.
9 The terms "intimacy" and "victim-defendant relationship" are used interchangeably in
this paper. I acknowledge that intimacy may be perceived as a more affective trait while
victim-defendant relationship may be perceived as a variable that is more structural in
nature. I use the terms here to refer to the degree of "closeness" that is perceived to exist
between victims and defendants. Drawing from work by Black and others, I consider
intimate partner relationships to be "closer" than other family relationships; other family
relationships to be closer than friends; friends to be closer than acquaintances; and, finally,
acquaintances to be closer than strangers. See BLACK, supra note 2, at 40-47; HORWITZ,
supra note 2; ROBERT SILVERMAN & LESLIE KENNEDY, DEADLY DEEDS: MURDER IN CANADA
65-105 (1993); Scott H. Decker, Exploring Victim-Offender Relationships in Homicide: The
Role of Individual and Event Characteristics, 10 JUST. Q. 585, 595-96 (1993); Robert A.
Silverman & Leslie W. Kennedy, Relational Distance and Homicide: The Role of the
Stranger, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272, 273 (1987). I recognize that there may be
variations within these broader categories as well. See Myma Dawson, The Cost of 'Lost'
Intimacy: The Effect of Relationship State on Criminal Justice Decision Making, 43 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 689, 694 (2003).
10 For a more detailed discussion of these focal concerns, see Steffensmeier, Ulmer &
Kramer, Interaction of Race, supra note 5, at 766-69.




Perspectives about intimacy and violence, and hypotheses about their effect
on criminal justice decision-making
General Perspective
Hypothesis: Violence that occurs between victims and defendants who share an
intimate relationship are treated more leniently than victims and defendants who
share more distant relationships because of assumptions, beliefs, or stereotypes
associated with intimate violence that are adhered to by criminal justice officials.
Focal Concern
1. Defendant Perspective 1-Mitigating emotions
Culpability Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other types of violent crime because such acts
are perceived to be motivated by strong emotions that may act
to reduce defendant culpability.
Perspective 2-Victim provocation
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other types of violence because such acts are
assumed to involve some degree of victim responsibility,
which may mitigate defendant culpability.
2. Protection Perspective #3-Deterrence
of the Public Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other types of violent crime because those
defendants who kill intimate partners are believed to be
beyond the deterrent message of the criminal law.
Perspective 4-Future dangerousness
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other cases of violence because criminal justice
officials believe offenders who victimize intimate partners
pose little future dangerousness to the public at large.
Perspective 5-Maintaining social order
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other types of violent crime because intimate
partner crimes are perceived to pose less threat to the
maintenance of social order than crimes that occur between




Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than cases of non-intimate partner violence because
intimates often share similar social ranks and, thus, are
perceived as less serious than crimes by offenders against
victims of higher social ranks (i.e., upward crimes).
3. Practicality Perspective 7-Frequent crimes
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than non-intimate partner violence because the
former are encountered more frequently by the courts than the
latter, leading to their classification as "normal" incidents that
are less serious, allowing for more expedient processing of
these cases.
Perspective 8-Informal versus formal controls
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other types of violence because criminal justice
officials perceive informal controls to be more available in
intimate disputes, thereby precluding the necessity of formal
controls.
Perspective 9-Legacy of patriarchal norms
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than other types of crimes because of the legacy of
patriarchal legal doctrines that reflect the belief that intimate
violence is inappropriate for legal intervention.
Perspective 10-Preserving the family unit
Hypothesis: Intimate partner violence may be treated more
leniently than non-intimate partner violence because criminal
justice officials believe they are preventing further disruption
of intimate or familial relationships, which is not a concern
with victims and defendants who share more distant
relationships.
A. FOCAL CONCERN 1: DEFENDANT CULPABILITY
The first focal concern emphasizes that the severity of punishment
should increase according to the degree of defendant culpability and is
usually associated with the retributive philosophy of punishment. Research
generally shows that offense seriousness, measured in terms of the
defendant's culpability and the harm caused by his offense, is the most
significant factor in sentencing. 12 Factors that may affect perceptions of
12 See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 1; W.S. Wilson Huang et al.,
2006] 1423
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defendant culpability are biographical factors, such as prior criminal history
(the existence of which may increase culpability); prior victimization of the
defendant (the existence of which may mitigate culpability); and the
centrality of the defendant's role in the crime (such as whether he was a
leader, an organizer, or a follower). Below, I describe two perspectives
about intimacy and violence that may be linked to assessments of defendant
culpability.
Perspective 1: Mitigating Emotions
One explanation for the association between intimacy and law draws
from the theory of relative culpability inherent in the law of homicide, and
relies on the distinction between "hot-blooded" and "cold-blooded" crimes.
Briefly, killing out of anger or some other strong emotion tends to decrease
the degree of moral and legal blameworthiness attributed to the defendant
and, consequently, reduces the degree of offense seriousness assigned to the
defendant's crime. 13 The rationale for this practice recognizes that strong
emotion can undermine or destroy a defendant's rational capacity to
deliberate and plan his actions, thereby precluding premeditation or intent.
In such situations, the passion or emotion as well as the circumstances that
incite that passion or emotion may reduce the defendant's agency and self-
restraint. Thus, when anger causes a defendant to lose control of his
actions, the degree of moral culpability is reduced. The role of mitigating
emotions in law, then, relies on the distinction that calculated and
unprovoked violence is generally more reprehensible than violence that
arises due to loss of emotional control.
In the past several decades, various criminal typologies have been
developed that distinguish between types of violent crime and, in particular,
homicide. For example, violent behavior has frequently been classified as
instrumental (cold-blooded) or expressive (hot-blooded). 14  Instrumental
violence refers to those events in which offenders seek to improve their
position through some rational calculation or plan that involves minimizing
risk, increasing gain, or both.15 Robbery is often cited as an example of an
Individual and Contextual Influences on Sentence Lengths: Examining Political
Conservatism, 76 PRISoN J. 398, 413 (1996).
13 Rapaport, The Domestic Discount, supra note 2, at 238-39.
14 See id. at 240-41.
15 Cf Dean G. Rojek & James L. Williams, Interracial vs. Intraracial Offenses in Terms
of the Victim/Offender Relationship, in HOMICIDE: THE VICTIM/OFFENDER CONNECTION 249,
257 (Anna Victoria Wilson ed., 1993) ("Instrumental homicides occur primarily between
strangers, and the primary intent is the forceful acquisition of money or property. There is




instrumental crime. In contrast, violent behavior that is expressive is
perceived to lack rational consideration, stemming instead from "character
contests," 16 retaliation or revenge, 17 or "righteous slaughter," in the case of
lethal violence.
18
Among the various typologies, intimate partner violence is typically
perceived to be the archetype of expressive crime because of the intensity of
intimate partner unions and the accompanying interactions.19 In contrast,
killings that occur among strangers are more often presumed to be
instrumental in character because they are believed to occur primarily in the
context of violence committed for gain.20  For example, robbery
homicide-a frequent example used to illustrate instrumental violence-is
more likely to occur among strangers or acquaintances.2' While some
researchers have begun to question the tendency to associate specific
relationship types with particular violent typologies,22 expressive violence
continues to be associated with intimate partner relationships and
instrumental violence continues to be associated with more distant
relationships.
In summary, the instrumental/expressive distinction often parallels
differences between planned (premeditated) and spontaneous ("crimes of
passion") offenses. Moreover, the instrumental/expressive dichotomy
16 David F. Luckenbill, Criminal Homicide as a Situated Transaction, 25 SOC. PROBS.
176 (1977).
17 Richard B. Felson, Aggression as Impression Management, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 205
(1978).
18 JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EvIL
12-51 (1988).
19 See, e.g., Rojek & Williams, supra note 15, at 264; Colin Loftin, Assaultive violence
as a contagious social process, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 550 (1986); Michael G.
Maxfield, Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 671, 680 (1989); Robert N. Parker & M. Dwayne Smith, Deterrence, Poverty
and Type of Homicide, 85 AM. J. Soc. 614, 615-16 (1979); Robert J. Sampson, Personal
Violence by Strangers: An Extension and Test of the Opportunity Model of Predatory
Victimization, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 327 (1987); M. Dwayne Smith & Robert N.
Parker, Type of Homicide and Variation in Regional Rates, 59 Soc. FORCES 136, 139 (1980).
20 Rojek & Williams, supra note 15, at 257; Richard Block, Victim-Offender Dynamics
in Violent Crime, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 743, 751-52 (1981); Marc Riedel, Stranger
Violence: Perspectives, Issues, and Problems, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 223, 251
(1987).
21 Riedel, supra note 20, at 248.
22 Kenneth Polk & David Ranson, Homicide in Victoria, in AUSTRALIAN VIOLENCE:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 53 (Duncan Chappell et al. eds., 1991); Terance D. Miethe &
Kriss A. Drass, Exploring the Social Context of Instrumental and Expressive Homicides: An




continues to be perceived as synonymous with the stranger/intimate
distinction by social science researchers and criminal justice actors.
Therefore, because calculated and unprovoked acts are more reprehensible
in law than spontaneous acts, and instrumental violence is believed to occur
most often among strangers, these defendants will be (and should be)
treated more seriously than other types of defendants, such as intimate
partners. The role of mitigating emotions in law, then, leads to the
expectation that criminal justice responses to violent crime between
intimate partners will be, and possibly should be, more lenient than
responses to violence between other types of victims and defendants.
Perspective 2: Victim Provocation
A second explanation for the association between intimacy and the law
that relates to defendant culpability emphasizes the role of the victim in the
incident. Judgments about victim provocation in violent incidents have
been shown to significantly affect decisions about charge reductions,
dismissals, and sentences.23 Moreover, juries and, to a lesser extent, judges
have been found to consider the contributory actions of the victim in the
incident during their deliberations.24 Victim provocation, however, can be
viewed both in the narrow and the broad sense. In the narrow sense, the
term "victim precipitation ' 21 is applied to those violent acts in which the
victim makes a direct, positive contribution to his own victimization.
Typically, this means that the victim was the first to use or threaten to use
physical violence against the defendant, to show or use a weapon, or to
strike out at another in a dispute.26 In short, victim precipitation is closely
linked to the legal notion of self-defense. In the broader sense, victim
"participation" may parallel legal notions of provocation defined in
Canadian law as "[a] wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to
be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control. 27
While the defense of provocation is exclusive to homicide, defendants in
cases of non-lethal violence may receive more lenient treatment depending
on the victim's perceived degree of responsibility. And, while victim
provocation is never a sufficient legal basis for case dismissal, it can lead to
charge reductions (such as from murder to manslaughter).
23 Williams, supra note 3, at 186-97; see also Marvin E. Wolfgang, Victim Precipitated
Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 1, 2 (1957).
24 HARRY J. KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (Phoenix 1971).
25 Wolfgang, supra note 23, at 2-3.
26 Id. at 252.
27 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 232(2) (1985).
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The role of victim provocation also supports the belief that criminal
justice responses to intimate violence will be more lenient because these
cases are often perceived to involve some degree of victim responsibility.
For example, research has shown that crimes between intimate partners are
more likely to generate images of victim provocation than crimes involving
strangers.2 8 In such cases, some may feel that the victim possessed some
degree of control over the circumstances of her victimization. The victim
may even be seen as somehow responsible for her own victimization by
remaining in an intimate, and obviously threatening, relationship. For
example, Rapaport states:
The victim is regarded as having assumed a measure of the risk of victimization
simply by remaining in an intimate relationship with the killer whom he or she may
have known to be disposed to violence. We assume that the victim possessed some
degree of control over the circumstances of his or her victimization, which puts the
homicide in a less frightening light and diminishes the degree of punishment thatS29
appears appropriate.
As a result, criminal justice officials may be more likely to question the
motives and doubt the allegations of a victim who knew the defendant prior
to the incident, particularly a victim who was the sexual partner or spouse
of the defendant.
According to this perspective, then, defendants who victimize intimate
partners may be perceived as less culpable than defendants who victimize
non-intimate partners because victim provocation in a violent act generally
decreases defendant culpability, and cases that involve defendants and
victims known to each other are often assumed to involve some form of
victim provocation. Therefore, criminal justice responses to violent crime
between intimate partners will be less severe than to violent acts between
non-intimates. This assumption would also lead to the expectation that in
cases where victims and defendants were estranged, the response to the
crime may be more severe than in those cases where the defendant and
victim were still in a relationship at the time the violence occurred. This
expectation stems from the perception that a victim who is estranged from
her abuser tried to diminish her risk of victimization by exiting the
relationship, and, thus, the extent that she contributed to her own
victimization is perceived to be minimal. For example, elsewhere I have
demonstrated that defendants who killed estranged intimate partners were
treated more severely by the courts than those who were still with the
victim, providing some support for the above hypothesis.30
28 Riedel, supra note 20, at 256.
29 Rapaport, Gender Discrimination, supra note 2, at 380.
30 See Dawson, supra note 9.
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B. FOCAL CONCERN 2: PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC
A second concern for criminal justice actors is the protection of the
public, which typically focuses on the need to incapacitate offenders or to
deter would-be offenders. More specifically, the concern is with calculating
the risk of recidivism or predicting future dangerousness of offenders. The
following four perspectives demonstrate how notions of dangerousness and
the likelihood of recidivism may differ depending on the type of victim-
defendant relationship, thereby affecting criminal court outcomes.
Perspective 3: Deterrence
Broadly speaking, law is concerned with two types of deterrence:
general deterrence and specific deterrence. General deterrence is the
symbolic effect of punishment that causes people to desist from offences
when they see others being punished. Specific deterrence is the effect of
punishment on the offender achieved through his actual experience of
punishment. Chambliss argues that the deterrent influence of punishment
depends, however, on two things: (1) whether crimes are expressive or
instrumental; and (2) whether offenders have a high or low commitment to
crime as a way of life.3' Under the deterrence doctrine, the threat of legal
sanction is considered to be most effective in deterring instrumental crimes
by persons with low commitment to a criminal lifestyle.32  Expressive
crimes, in contrast, are often viewed as "undeterrable" by legal sanctions.
In short, instrumental crimes and offenders are more susceptible to legal
threats than expressive crimes and offenders and, thus, more appropriate
targets for punishment.
As already discussed, one assumption about offenders who commit
violent acts against intimate partners also relates to the likelihood of
deterrence 33-that of the out-of-control killer whose emotions or passion
undermine his ability to act rationally (as noted in Perspective 1). This
underscores the perception that offenders who kill intimate partners are
primarily expressive actors with low intent and little commitment to crime
as a way of life. In responding to these killings, then, criminal justice
officials may believe they are relatively powerless to deter such acts,34
justifying the more lenient treatment of intimate killings. In other words,
31 William J. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 703, 712 (1967).
32 See Charles W. Thomas & J. Sherwod Williams, Actors, Actions and Deterrence: A
Reformulation of Chambliss's Typology of Deterrence, in TREATING THE OFFENDER:
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 35 (Marc Riedel & Pedro A. Vales eds., 1977).
33 Rapaport, The Domestic Discount, supra note 2, at 237.
34 LUNDSGAARDE, supra note 3, at 173-98.
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they are perceived to be isolated events prompted by a loss of emotional
control and, therefore, neither general nor specific deterrence are
appropriate goals.
Perspective 4: Future Dangerousness
A second explanation for the association between intimacy and law
highlights how criminal justice officials explicitly or implicitly evaluate the
potential future dangerousness posed by defendants when allocating
sanctions. Because criminal justice officials are responsible for protecting
the public and reducing the volume of crime, events that they perceive to be
isolated "crimes of passion" with little probability of re-occurring may not
be considered deserving of severe sanctions.35 In contrast, offenders who
prey on strangers in public places are feared most by society36 and, thus,
tend to attract more severe criminal justice responses. The belief is that the
courts need to concentrate on violence by strangers because such offenders
are perceived to pose the most danger to the public. 37  The future
dangerousness assumption, then, leads to the perception that violent
offenders unlikely to re-offend pose little danger to the public and, thus, do
not warrant severe sanctions.
As noted previously, offenders in cases of intimate violence are
sometimes perceived to be otherwise peaceful individuals who responded to
some type of provocation (see Perspective 2). As a result, devoting
valuable court time to these defendants is believed to create an additional
burden on an already overtaxed criminal justice system that should be
focusing on punishing more dangerous criminals who prey on strangers.38
Consistent with this, Miethe found that the source of disparate treatment
based on degree of intimacy between victims and defendants actually
stemmed from differential conceptions of "dangerousness. 39  His study
showed that factors indicative of "dangerousness" such as being male,
black, and using a weapon, were important when sentencing offenders who
victimized strangers, but had no effect on sentences for offenders who knew
their victims. 40 Miethe concluded that it was not images of culpability and
35 id.
36 Joann L. Miller, Peter H. Rossi & Jon E. Simpson, Felony Punishments: A Factorial
Survey of Perceived Justice in Criminal Sentencing, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396
(1991).
37 Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, Crime Between Acquaintances: The Response of
Criminal Courts, 6 VICTIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 175, 176 (1981).
38 Id.
39 Miethe, supra note 3, at 590.
40 Id. at 584-85.
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provocation that lead to varying outcomes; rather, differential treatment
arose from varying conceptions of "dangerousness."' 1 The "future
dangerousness" perspective, then, leads to the expectation that criminal
justice responses to violent crime among intimates will be less severe than
violent crime among non-intimates. While this perspective may appear
similar to the previous discussion about deterrence, it has to do with
perceptions of danger to the public, while the previous discussion pertains
to perceptions about an offender's susceptibility to deterrence.
Perspective 5: Maintaining Social Order
Also stemming from a concern for public protection, an explanation
for the lenient treatment of intimate partner violence may draw from the
overriding concern of any society (and, thus, its systems of formal social
control) to maintain social order. According to this explanation, the state
negatively sanctions violent acts that directly threaten overall public welfare
or that interfere directly with the individual's right to enjoy property.
According to Lundsgaarde, how serious violence is perceived to be depends
on the degree of threat posed to the social order.42 For example, homicides
that involve police officers, firemen and public officials as victims
generally and symbolically threaten the social order, so therefore, public
sanctions against these killers may be particularly severe. Whether or not
an act of violence is perceived to threaten the social order often depends, in
large part, on the social distance between the victim and the offender.
Sanctioning agents often see violence among intimate partners as posing
less of a threat than killings among strangers. Lundsgaarde explains: "This
is true in part because intimates form symmetrical social relationships that
insulate them within a series of obligations subject to enforcement by social
and psychological sanctions. The robber, rapist, killer, or even the self-
styled terrorist is not restrained in his behavior by anything other than
criminal sanctions.,
43
Thus, violence that arises from unsatisfactory interpersonal
relationships is not perceived as dangerous to the maintenance of social
order. Rather, such acts, which often take place primarily in the privacy of
the victim's or offender's home, are commonly perceived to arise as a result
of life's stressful events. Therefore, defendants who victimize intimates are
more likely to escape legal sanctioning or to be treated more leniently by
the courts.
4' Id. at 590.
42 LUNDSGAARDE, supra note 3, at 140-41, 148-49.
41 Id. at 141.
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In contrast, "[t]he killer who chooses a stranger as his victim overtly
threatens the preservation of social order., 44  Therefore, violence by
strangers is treated more seriously by legal officials because defendants in
these cases are perceived to be more dangerous, unpredictable, and
indiscriminate in their selection of victims. 45 Moreover, it is these types of
offenders that members of society fear most, in part because of the
perceived public nature and randomness of such crimes.46 For example, as
already noted, robbery homicide is more likely to be committed among
strangers and in public places.47 This type of crime interferes directly with
an individual's right to enjoy property. The belief that intimate partner
violence does not threaten the social order leads to the expectation that
criminal justice responses to violent crime among intimates will be more
lenient than violent crime among non-intimates.
Perspective 6: Horizontal Crimes
A final explanation for the lenient treatment of intimate violence that
stems from a concern for public protection also emphasizes the law's
purpose in maintaining social order. However, the emphasis is on the role
of social stratification in determining both the threat posed to social order
and, in turn, the severity of the criminal justice response. As Black has
pointed out,48 and others have documented,49 crimes committed among
victims and defendants with similar social ranks in society (i.e., horizontal
crimes) are not viewed as seriously by legal officials as acts committed by
defendants of lower social rank than their victims (i.e., upward crimes).
This assumption about horizontal crimes leads to the expectation, then, that
crimes among those of similar, or more particularly in lower, ranks will be
treated more leniently because they are not perceived as a serious threat to
the social order.
The relationship between defendants and victims may be associated
with whether or not violent acts are perceived to be horizontal or upward
crimes. That is, violence between intimate partners is more often perceived
as horizontal because intimate relationships tend to be established among
people of the same social and racial backgrounds. In fact, Ferraro and
44 Id. at 140.
41 Id. at 150.
46 Jennie McIntyre, Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Law Enforcement, 374 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 34 (1967).
47 Philip J. Cook, Robbery Violence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 357, 365-66 (1987);
see Riedel, supra note 20, at 248.
48 See BLACK, supra note 1, at 13-31.
49 See, e.g., AUSTIN T. TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER (1969).
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Boychuk argue that it is the similarity in social rank of the victim and the
defendant more than the intimate nature of their relationship that leads to
the lenient treatment of these crimes. 50 They argue that this social and
racial homogeneity is more important in law than the sexual hierarchy
highlighted by many feminist legal scholars.51  As such, Ferraro and
Boychuk argue that the law tends to maintain a patriarchal authority with
distinct race and class boundaries. 52 Violence that does not disturb these
boundaries is less threatening to the dominant social order than violence
that crosses them and, consequently, is less likely to be negatively
sanctioned. They state that:
The purpose of this system is to maintain the social order. Crime that does not
threaten this order will be treated leniently if at all. The vast majority of crimes of
interpersonal violence vent anger and frustration at those closest at hand, rather than at
structural sources of unemployment, poverty, and pollution. Rather than threaten the
status quo, they keep it safe.
5 3
In contrast, the state is particularly concerned with stranger violence
because this type of victimization is generally believed to be upward crime
and feared most by members of the public.54 Consequently, defendants
who victimize intimate partners may be treated more leniently than those
who victimize non-intimate partners because horizontal crimes are believed
to pose little threat to the social order, and such crimes are assumed to
involve defendants and victims who are closely related by blood or sexual
ties and who share social, economic, and racial links.
C. FOCAL CONCERN 3: PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS
The practical constraints of the criminal justice system, both at the
organizational and individual level, also come into play in criminal justice
decision-making. For example, organizational concerns of criminal justice
50 Kathleen J. Ferraro & Tascha Boychuk, The Court's Response to Interpersonal
Violence: A Comparison of Intimate and Nonintimate Assault, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 209, 223 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1992).
51 Compare id. at 223-24, with Susan Edwards, A Socio-Legal Evaluation of Gender
Ideologies in Domestic Violence Assault and Spousal Homicides, 10 VICTIMOLOGY: INT'L J.
186 (1985).
52 Ferraro & Boychuk, supra note 50, at 223.
" Id. at 224.
54 JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1972); MARC
RIEDEL, STRANGER VIOLENCE: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY (1993); McIntyre, supra note 46.
But see Marc Ouimet & Edward J. Coyle, Fear of crime and sentenci.-g punitiveness:




actors may include ensuring the stable flow of cases, maintaining working
relationships among courtroom actors, and being sensitive to local and state
correctional crowding and resources.55 In addition, criminal justice actors
may also have individual concerns about further disruption of familial ties,
the offender's ability to do time, health conditions or special needs.56
Moreover, because judges may often be accountable for their sentencing
decisions within the framework of local politics and community norms,
they are likely to be sensitive to the impact of offender recidivism on the
court's standing in the community.57 The final four perspectives highlight
how assumptions, beliefs or stereotypes about intimacy and violence may
relate to organizational and individual concerns of criminal court personnel
and, therefore, may lead to more lenient treatment for some types of
offenders or offenses.
Perspective 7: Frequent Crimes
Assessments of offense or case seriousness are often made in relation
to the kinds of cases that are regularly encountered in a particular social
control setting. In other words, the decision to treat a particular case as an
instance of something serious depends, in part, on the overall range and
character of cases processed by a particular agent or agency. The
composition of the total collection of cases can be thought of as a
"contextual gestalt, 58 within which there is a "sliding scale of severity.
55 Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, Interaction of Race, supra note 5, at 767 (citing RoY
B. FLEMMING, PETER F. NARDULLI & JAMES EISENSTEIN, THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS
AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 23-26 (1992)); see also Jo Dixon, The
Organizational Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1162 (1995);
Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, Interaction of Race, supra note 5, at 766-69; Jeffrey Ulmer,
The Organization and Consequences of Social Pasts in Criminal Courts, 36 Soc. Q. 587,
589-90 (1995); Jeffrey Ulmer & John Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing
Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY
383, 402-04 (1996).
56 KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 9-10 (1994); JOHN HOGARTH,
SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971); Darrell Steffensmeier, Assessing the Impact of
the Women 's Movement on Sex-based Differences in the Handling of Adult Criminal
Defendants, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 349-53 (1980); Steffensmeier, Kramer & Ulmer, Age
Differences, supra note 5, at 599.
51 JAMES EISENSTEIN, ROY B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF
JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988).
58 Robert M. Emerson, Holistic effects in social control decision-making, 17 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 425, 429 (1983).
59 See ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 257 (1970) (arguing that doctors make professional decisions about




Using this hypothetical scale, criminal justice actors make judgments about
particular cases that come before them. The need for such a scale may arise
out of a need to deal with large numbers of cases in an expedient manner
under often rigid time constraints.
In the criminal justice system, judges, lawyers, and police frequently
use descriptive categories and concepts to organize their daily activities and
keep the "wheels of justice" moving. As a result, in the course of routinely
interacting with defendants, criminal justice officials gain knowledge "of
the typical manner in which offenses of given classes are committed, the
social characteristics of the persons who commit them, the features of the
settings in which they occur, the types of victims often involved and the
like., 60 This process of classification results in the construction of typical
or "normal" crimes through which criminal justice officials perceive and
respond to cases.61 Consequently, decisions made by criminal justice
officials are often based on tacit understandings related to or based upon
background expectancies of crimes, victims and defendants.62 According to
this perspective, then, cases that are frequently encountered by criminal
justice officials are more likely to be classified as "normal" crimes and
perceived as less serious in nature than other offenses or types of offenders
encountered less frequently. These "normal crime" categories may be used
to facilitate the legal process and, as a result, lead to more lenient treatment
of some types of defendants and some types of violent crime.
One characteristic commonly used to classify crimes is the relationship
between a defendant and his victim. Waegel found, for example, that "the
earliest piece of information sought out [in a case] and the feature.., given
the greatest interpretative significance [by legal actors] is whether the
offense occurred between parties who were in some way known to one
another prior to the incident. 63 One reason for this is that the relationship
between a victim and a perpetrator is seen as a core feature of the routine
offense pattern in criminal cases. A bar killing, for instance, may more
likely be viewed as a routine homicide if the victim and perpetrator were
acquainted. A "known" relationship between the parties involved elicits
assumptions or stereotypes about "normal" bar fights between
acquaintances as events that often do not have clearly defined victims or
offenders and usually involve the consumption of alcohol, drugs, or both. 64
60 Sudnow, supra note 7, at 259.
6 Id. at 260-63.
62 Edwards, supra note 51, at 196.
63 William B. Waegel, Case Routinization in Investigative Police Work, 28 Soc. PROBS.
263, 270 (1981).
64 See id. at 270-71.
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Similarly, an agency that deals regularly with homicides not only becomes
familiar with, hardened to, and less affected by such cases, but also begins
to make more refined and varied distinctions among types of "serious" or
"normal" homicides. 65
Because interpersonal violence generally occurs between defendants
and victims who know each other,66 and defendants who are known to their
victims are more likely to be apprehended and arrested than those who are
strangers,67 the proportion of cases involving defendants and victims who
know each other that enter the criminal justice system is far higher than
cases among strangers. For example, in Canada in 2004, of those homicide
cases that were solved (i.e., an offender was identified), only 15% of the
victims had been killed by strangers. 68 According to this perspective, then,
cases that involve victims and defendants known to each other may be
treated more leniently because criminal justice actors encounter these cases
more frequently in the daily processing of crime, resulting in descriptive
categories or concepts being used to classify them as "normal" crimes.
Perspective 8: Informal Versus Formal Controls
Another perspective that emphasizes the practical constraints of the
criminal justice process as a source for leniency in cases of intimate partner
violence draws attention to the inverse relationship that is perceived to exist
between formal and informal social controls. According to this perspective,
law or governmental social control is only one form of social control.
69
Other more informal social controls also appear in social life-within
families, friendships, neighborhoods, organizations, and groups of all kinds.
According to Black, "the quantity of law increases as the quantity of social
control of these other kinds decreases, and vice versa., 70  As such, this
assumption supports the belief that, where informal controls are more
visible, formal controls will likely be minimal or absent.
65 Id. at 272-73.
66 Carolyn R. Block & Anitgone Christakos, Intimate Partner Homicide in Chicago over
29 Years, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 496, 496 (1995); Sharon Moyer, Race, gender, and homicide:
Comparrisons between aboriginals and other Canadians, 34 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 387, 390
(1992).
67 SYLVAIN TREMBLAY, JURISTAT: CAN. CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME STATISTICS
IN CANADA, 1999 (2000); Davis & Smith, supra note 37, at 176.
68 MIA DAUVERGNE, JURISTAT: CAN. CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE IN CANADA,
2004 1, 7 (2005).
69 BLACK, supra note 1, at 2-3; HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 2.
70 BLACK, supra note 1, at 6; see also id. at 107.
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Whether formal or informal social controls are present is determined
by various social structural characteristics. 71 For the purpose of this paper,
the key dimension is social morphology or "the distribution of people in
relation to one another., 72  Morphology can be defined by interaction
networks, relational intimacy, and integration with others in society.73
Black argues that law will be most visible where there is little interaction,
intimacy, or integration; that is, where informal social controls are
weakest. 74 Despite the growing presence of law among intimates, those
who share more distant relationships are still subject to more legal control
because such relationships involve greater relational distance. Black argues
that the closer the relational distance in crimes of interpersonal violence, the
less severe the response by formal social control agencies. 75 For example,
in the midst of strangers, law will reach its highest level because informal
social controls are absent. In contrast, little law enters the domain of
intimate partner relations, where informal social controls are perceived to
be dominant. In some cases, Black argues, intimacy may provide immunity
from law.
76
Furthermore, when intimate disputes do enter the legal realm, what
happens may depend upon the degree of intimacy that exists between the
parties. For instance, Black argues that when a man kills or beats his wife,
the longer they have been married, the less serious his crime will be
perceived within the legal system. In short, the longer their relationship, the
closer their relational distance, and so less law is required.77 In contrast, if a
man is not bound by the legitimacy of a marriage license, his crime may be
seen as more serious. In summary, this perspective leads to the expectation,
then, that criminal justice responses to violent crime among intimates will
be less severe than violent crime among non-intimates. This, again,
supports the argument that men who are estranged from their female
partners will be treated more strictly than those offenders who are still in a
relationship with the victim because the former can no longer hide behind
the legitimacy of marriage.78
71 For review, see id.
72 Id. at 37.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 37-59.
" Id. at 40-44.
16 Id. at 42.
77 Id. at 44.
78 Rapaport, The Domestic Discount, supra note 2, at 238.
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Perspective 9: Legacy of Patriarchal Norms
Another perspective that highlights the constraints of the criminal
justice process suggests that these "constraints" are only perceived to exist
by criminal justice officials because of the legacy of patriarchal legal
doctrines that contained an inherent sexual hierarchy. Early feminist
researchers argued that the law's presence (or absence) in the domestic
sphere stemmed from traditional beliefs about the nuclear family and its
role and function within larger society.79 The home was viewed as an
enduring, loving, protective environment that shielded its members from the
evils of the outside world. Within this environment, nineteenth-century
legal doctrines subordinated a wife to her husband, whose responsibility it
was to keep the family in order. Historically, under common law, the legal
existence of a woman was suspended when she married. This meant that
she could not appeal to the law for protection from acts by her husband that
would otherwise be criminal. As a result, "a husband had a right to force
sexual intercourse upon his wife, to beat her, and to confine her., 80 In the
nineteenth-century, the Married Women's Property Act was meant to
improve the civil status of women; however, the criminal law continued to
defer to the authority of men in the domestic sphere.81
Today, feminists argue that the rhetoric of marital equality conceals
how similar attitudes, beliefs, and practices continue to exist.
82
Assumptions about hierarchy and control in marriage and other types of
intimate unions continue to reinforce entrenched cultural notions that
support or ignore the use of violence between intimate partners. 83 These
cultural notions are, in turn, perpetuated through the language of law. As a
result, despite the increasing recognition that domestic violence is a serious
crime, the privacy of the home continues to operate within the legal system
as an ideological rationale for refusing to protect abused women.84 This
perspective argues that the historical separation of public and private (or
domestic) spheres and the varying role of law in each served, and continues
79 Martha A. Fineman, Preface to THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE, supra note
2, at xi, xiii.
80 Rapaport, The Domestic Discount, supra note 2, at 238 (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES (1809)).
81 See id. (discussing the Married Women's Property Act).
82 Fineman, supra note 79, at xiv-xv; Isabel Marcus, Refraining "Domestic Violence":
Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 11,
22-23.
83 Fineman, supra note 79, at xi-xvii.
84 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE
VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 36, 36.
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to serve, as the mechanism through which criminal justice officials
downplay the seriousness of intimate violence as a social problem.
Perspective 10: Preserving the Family Unit
Related to the previous discussion, a final perspective contends that the
increasing reliance on the criminal justice 'system to deal with violence
between intimate partners actually contradicts what legal actors perceive to
be their mandate. This contradiction arises because criminal justice
officials believe they should try to preserve the familial unit when
responding to cases of intimate violence that come before them. As such,
the increasing role of the courts in dealing with intimate violence may not
be perceived by criminal justice actors as appropriate, despite the increasing
number of intimate disputes that are entering the system. While research
examining this issue is limited, interviews with criminal justice officials
suggest that they are reluctant to proceed with cases when they stem from
arguments between partners or lovers.85 Some judges indicate that they
often feel imprisonment would serve no purpose and might, in fact, disrupt
relationships further if a defendant was severely sanctioned for what is
often perceived to be an overreaction to personal or intimate grievances.
Therefore, based on this belief, intimate partner violence may be
treated more leniently because legal actors do not want to disrupt familial
relationships further by responding to disputes that they feel are not
appropriate for legal intervention in the first place. Thus, when cases
involving intimate partners are not dismissed altogether (which is
increasingly difficult with the implementation of pro-arrest and pro-
prosecution policies), these cases often receive lighter (or non-custodial)
dispositions than cases that involve victims and defendants who share more
distant relationships. In fact, it has been argued that the major pattern of
responses to crimes between intimate partners is a preference to keep such
86
cases out of the legal system.
III. How VALID ARE PERSPECTIVES ABOUT INTIMACY AND VIOLENCE?
The ten perspectives described above highlight various assumptions,
beliefs, or stereotypes about the relationship between a defendant and his
victim and characteristics about violent events. These perspectives also
identify how the cues prompted by these assumptions, beliefs, or
stereotypes might lead to more lenient criminal justice treatment of intimate
85 E.g., GOTTFREDSON & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 1, at 123; VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 3, at 19-20.
86 GOTrFREDSON & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 1.
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violence and, more specifically, intimate partner violence. All of them lead
to the expectation that a defendant who victimizes an intimate partner will
(and possibly should) be treated more leniently than a defendant who
victimizes a non-intimate partner. While it is important to examine whether
adherence to such perspectives do actually affect criminal justice decision-
making, it is equally important to determine whether such views are valid in
the first place, or whether they stem from conventional criminological or
sociological wisdom that has not been supported empirically. To date,
however, the lack of case detail often required for such an analysis and the
lack of any consistent measures for some of the variables that capture these
perspectives have prevented such an examination.
To begin to address this gap in the research, I briefly explore the
validity of the first key perspective related to the role of mitigating
emotions. Recall that research has shown that intimate partner violence is
often portrayed as arising from a loss of control or the presence of strong
emotion-the typical "crime of passion" or "hot-blooded" crime. I argue
that, if this assumption is valid, cases of intimate partner violence are less
likely to have evidence of premeditation or intent than cases of non-intimate
partner violence because the ability to preplan and deliberate has
traditionally been perceived to preclude the presence of strong emotion or
loss of control.
Using 108 cases of homicide, I assess the validity of the mitigating
emotions perspective by examining whether the existence of premeditation
does actually differ across the two relationship types-intimate partner and
non-intimate partner." This data was drawn from a larger dataset
documenting all homicides that were resolved by the courts in Toronto,
Ontario, between 1974 and 1996.88 In this larger dataset, information was
gathered from coroner's files, police records, crown attorney files, and
newspaper archives for close to one hundred variables, including victim and
offender characteristics, the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the
criminal justice outcome. The use of more than one data source allowed for
the cross-referencing and validation of information between sources,
87 Recall that I define intimate partner homicide as those killings that occur between
current or former legal spouses, common-law partners or dating couples. Non-intimate
partner homicide is defined as those killings that occur between family members (not
including spouses), friends, acquaintances and strangers. See supra note 6. I acknowledge
that both categories--"intimate partner" and "non-intimate partner"--include a variety of
relationships; however, for the purpose of this analysis, I argue that intimate partner
homicides are most closely associated with those killings that are typified as "crimes of
passion." Thus, comparing these cases with other types of killings should be the most
informative.
88 See Dawson, supra note 3, at 111-12.
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leading to more confidence in the coding process. However, because files
vary in the amount and type of detail (as is often the case with criminal
justice records), the ability to collect detailed information for some
variables was limited. For this reason, a smaller sample was used to
examine the existence of premeditation.
The 108 cases examined in this paper comprise what Daly refers to as
a "deep-sample" of cases. 89 In this paper, a deep-sample of cases are those
selected according to criteria of similarity for which more detailed
information is collected and compared. Using this sample, I compare the
relative frequency of "evidence of premeditation" in the fifty-four cases of
intimate partner homicides to the fifty-four cases of non-intimate partner
homicides. Before describing how "evidence of premeditation" is
measured, I discuss how the 108 cases were selected for analysis from the
larger dataset.
A. SELECTING THE DEEP-SAMPLE
One advantage of quantitative analyses of large data sets is the ability
to discern patterns among a large number of cases while holding constant
the effects of other factors relevant to the outcomes being examined.
However, in-depth details about the circumstances that surround a crime are
often not available in large datasets because of the time required to gather
such information for a large number of cases. As a result, it is often not
possible to consider the effect of a number of important variables that may
be relevant to criminal justice outcomes in cases of interpersonal violence.
For example, while evidence of premeditation does affect the severity of the
criminal justice response to violent crime, this legal factor is seldom
captured in studies that examine determinants of case outcomes. In
contrast, because qualitative (or case-based) analyses generally focus on a
smaller number of cases, the researcher can gather greater detail on the
crime, the defendant, the victim, and the criminal justice process. These
qualitative studies can bring depth and complexity to the meaning of crime
and punishment by considering the effect of factors that have traditionally
not been available for analyses in larger datasets. It is important, though,
that similar cases are compared, and this comparison can be achieved using
the deep-sample approach.
To select the deep-sample, I had several considerations. I wanted to
match "similar" cases that varied only by the relationship between the
defendant and his victim. Therefore, drawing from Daly,90 I designed and




implemented a decision protocol to select the deep-sample cases
systematically. First, I determined the number of potential pairs of cases-
comparing intimate partner to other relationship types-whose charges at
arraignment and conviction were the same, suggesting that similar
circumstances surrounded the killing, at least on the surface. Because there
were fewer cases involving intimate partners, the maximum number of
potential pairs was equivalent to the number of available cases involving
intimate partners for each charge-conviction combination (i.e., murder
charge-manslaughter conviction in both cases or murder charge-murder
conviction in both cases and so on).
According to the above statutory charge-conviction criteria, I devised
the following selection-decision protocol to achieve a matched sample of
cases: (1) gender of defendant; (2) gender of victim; (3) mode of conviction
(guilty plea versus trial); and (4) the time period in which the case was
resolved through the courts (1984 and earlier; 1985 and later).91 Once cases
were matched using these criteria, I selected cases in which the defendants'
prior criminal record and age were similar. For example, when intimate
partner or other relationship pairs had identical statutory charges and
convictions, I then picked those in which the gender of the defendant and
the victim, the mode of conviction, and the year of disposition were the
same. From these cases, I attempted to match according to the remaining
two factors: the defendant's prior record and age.92 Throughout the process
of selecting cases, I did not know the sentence that a defendant received.
After selecting the deep-sample cases, I collected additional, more detailed
information that would allow a determination of whether there had been
evidence of premeditation in each case. I turn to a description of the
measure of premeditation below.
91 Because significant changes have taken place during the past several decades in North
America with respect to the treatment of intimate partner violence by the courts, similar
cases needed to be selected from similar legal and social environments for valid
comparisons. While this break period may seem somewhat arbitrary, the early 1980s
witnessed the beginning of significant legal and policy changes with respect to intimate
partner violence.
92 I also attempted to make sure that victims' ages were similar, i.e., that one victim was
not a child and the other victim an adult, even though this factor was not included in the
original criteria because killings in which children are the victim are often treated severely
by the courts. After matching based on the selected criteria, I noticed that various pairs were
exact matches, but that the victims differed substantially in age. For example, in one
matched pair, the victims were both female, but one was thirty-five years old and one was
two years old. Because of the different dynamics involved in child killings, I decided to use
victim age as an additional criterion for matching. Also, because one case in each pair
always involved sexual intimates, there were no victims under age seventeen and no
defendants under the age of sixteen years in the deep-sample.
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B. DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PREMEDITATION
The existence of premeditation or intent has historically been seen as a
factor that makes a murder more serious. 93 The rationale is that there is an
added "moral culpability to a murder that is planned and deliberate which
justifies a harsher sentence ... by virtue of planning and deliberation with
relation to the taking of a human life.",94 However, the meaning of the term
has been the subject of extensive discussion in case law and has not yet
been discussed to any extent in criminal justice research. Inherent in the
notion of premeditation is the notion of intent or mens rea that distinguishes
between murder and manslaughter. For example, if it can be proven that
the defendant intended to kill the victim, the defendant's culpability is
sufficient to warrant a murder conviction. However, as described in the
discussion around the role of mitigating emotions,95 killing out of anger or
some other strong emotion can mitigate a defendant's culpability because
his emotion is perceived to undermine the rational capacity required for
planning and deliberation.
Drawing from work by Wallace,96 I use a modified version of
indicators that signify varying degrees of premeditation or intent. The
existence of one or more of these indicators in a homicide suggests that the
act may have been a "cold-blooded" rather than a "hot-blooded" crime
thereby precluding the presence of mitigating emotions. The indicators are
as follows: (1) the offender followed or laid in wait for an opportunity to
kill the victim; (2) the offender broke into the victim's home; (3) the victim
was sleeping when killed; (4) the offender made previous attempts or
threats to kill the victim; (5) the offender brought a gun to the home or
location of the victim; (6) the offender purchased a gun or weapon
immediately prior to the killing; (7) the offender had written a suicide note
indicating intent to kill himself and the victim; and, finally, (8) other
indicators, not including the above, that occurred only once or twice (such
as, changing a will, making funeral arrangements, taking out a life
insurance policy, or contracting out the killing).97 Using the 108 deep-
93 ISABEL GRANT, DOROTHY CHUNN & CHRISTINE BOYLE, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 4-31,4-
32, 4-34, 4-35 (1998).
94 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., § 214(2) [§ 231(2)] (2000); GRANT, CHUNN, & BOYLE,
supra note 93, at § 7, 8.
95 See supra Table 1.
96 ALISON WALLACE, HOMICIDE: THE SOCIAL REALITY 168-70 (1986).
97 See infra Appendix A for sample crime narratives that illustrate how each indicator
demonstrates some degree of premeditation and/or intent. It could be argued that some of
the above indicators would be more common in cases of intimate partner violence (i.e.,
victim sleeping when killed, previous threat to kill the victim). However, it is equally likely
that other indicators would be more common among those with little to no prior relationship
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sample cases, I coded whether there was evidence of premeditation or intent
and what type(s) of evidence existed based on these indicators.98
C. RESULTS
Contrary to the view that intimate violence is the typical "crime of
passion," evidence of premeditation and intent was more frequent among
those cases that involved intimate partners (twenty-two of fifty-four cases
or 41%) than among non-intimate partner homicides (seventeen of fifty-
four cases or 31%) in this sample of cases. While this difference is not
statistically significant, it does challenge the traditional view that acts of
intimate violence are primarily hot-blooded events.99 In addition, despite
the greater evidence of premeditation in cases of intimate partner violence,
Table 2 shows that those defendants who killed intimate partners were more
likely to receive shorter sentences in the majority of pair-wise comparisons
(44% of the cases) than defendants who killed other types of victims or
similar sentences to such defendants (32% of the cases). Simply put,
evidence of premeditation-recognized as a legal variable in criminal
justice decision-making--did not appear to lead to more serious sentences
for many of the intimate partner offenders in this exploratory analysis; in
fact, more serious sentences resulted for intimate partner killers in less than
one-quarter of the cases. While I recognize that this finding is based on a
small number of cases, it still challenges the view that intimate partner
killings are primarily spontaneous crimes of passion, but shows that shorter
sentences still result.
(i.e., followed/laid in wait, victim lured to their death). The underlying point, however, is
that many actions that signify premeditation by offenders who kill intimate partners have
traditionally not been perceived as such and have served to support the assumption that these
crimes usually arise out of a loss of emotional control.
98 1 recognize that assessing the offender's intent or documenting the existence of
premeditation in homicide cases is difficult given that the victim and, sometimes, the
offender are dead (as in the case of homicide-suicide). As a result, suppositions about the
underlying motivations and circumstances leading up to the event are post facto and often
speculative. As such, the protocol adopted for classifying "evidence of premeditation" was
conservative. If the information available clearly demonstrated evidence of premeditation as
outlined by the various indicators, the case was classified as having "evidence of
premeditation." If there was no mention of evidence indicating premeditation, the case was
classified as having "no evidence of premeditation." If available information suggested that
premeditation may have existed, but the evidence was inconclusive, it was coded as having
"possible evidence of premeditation." This coding process resulted in a three-category
variable that was later collapsed into a dichotomy by combining "no evidence of
premeditation" with "possible evidence of premeditation" and comparing these cases to
those in which there was clear evidence of premeditation.




Punishment outcomes in pair-wise analysis of crime seriousness in deep-
sample data: Toronto, Ontario, 1974-1996
Punishment outcome # of Pairs % Sample Mean sentence length (years)
Total Intimate Other
partner
Same sentence 17 32 16.12 - -
received
Sentence shorter for 24 44 10.35 8.21 12.49
intimate partners
Sentence longer for 13 24 8.60 10.46 6.73
intimate partners
Total 54 100
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this paper was to document existing
perspectives about intimacy and violence and to describe how these various
perspectives, including assumptions, beliefs, or stereotypes, might serve to
justify criminal justice leniency in cases of intimate partner violence
compared to the treatment of other types of violent crime. As a secondary
objective, I wanted to provide an example of how one might assess the
validity of these perspectives by focusing on the role of mitigating
emotions. With respect to the first objective, using the focal concerns
framework, I demonstrated that there are a number of perspectives about
intimacy and violence that can lead to particular expectations about how
and why these crimes occur. I have also shown how these perspectives can
be used to justify differential treatment that might lead criminal justice
actors and the general public alike to believe intimate violence should be
treated more leniently than other types of crimes.
With respect to the second objective, I began to address a gap in the
research that has yet to systematically examine the validity of the common
assumptions that surround intimacy and violence. My exploratory analysis
demonstrated that we need to be cautious about adhering to the
criminological or sociological wisdom that assumes certain case
characteristics are present (or absent) when violence occurs between
victims and offenders who share specific relationship types and, in
particular, an intimate partner relationship. Contrary to expectations about
intimate partner violence, my analysis showed that premeditation or intent
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occurred with greater frequency in cases that involved intimate partners
compared to those that involved non-intimate partners. Despite the greater
evidence of premeditation, however, those who killed intimate partners
received more lenient sentences than the comparison group in the majority
of cases. While my sample is small, it does provide more case detail than
larger datasets and is, therefore, able to examine a variable-
premeditation-for which information is rarely available. My finding leads
to the question of why, given the greater role of premeditation in intimate
partner homicides, do more lenient sentences result compared to cases of
non-intimate partner homicide, keeping in mind that similar cases were
matched and compared.
With an exploratory analysis such as this, concrete conclusions are not
possible, but my goal here is to underscore the need for future research that
assesses the validity of this and other assumptions while, at the same time,
examining their impact on criminal justice decision-making. If, for
example, one or more of the assumptions described above are valid and
found to play a role in criminal justice decisions on punishment outcomes
in cases of violent crime, then we have partially explained and supported
what has been "sociological wisdom" to date-the differential legal
treatment of violent offenders who share various types of relationships with
their victims. If, however, the validity of one or more assumptions is
challenged, as was the case in this analysis, and it is found that these same
assumptions affect criminal justice responses to these crimes, it becomes
increasingly important that we begin to question their role in the criminal
justice processing of violent crime.
To date, few studies have systematically examined whether there have
been changes in criminal justice attitudes during a period of significant
social change in response to intimate partner violence. In other words, we
have yet to examine whether traditional assumptions about intimacy and
violence-whether valid or not--continue to reign in the criminal justice
system despite three decades of social and legal change prompted by
feminists as part of the domestic violence movement. Criminal law
recognizes that there are different degrees of seriousness in cases of violent
crime as emphasized by the focal concerns framework. Determining how to
assess whether violence is similar in both a social and a legal context
(warranting similar punishments) and what factors may be important when
making such comparisons remains an issue that needs to be explored.
While this study was able to consider the role of one factor that may
determine different degrees of defendant culpability, it can be considered
only a first, tentative step in understanding the role of various legal
dimensions that may be important when assessing culpability and how it
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relates to other characteristics of the crime (in this case, victim-defendant
relationship).
If, as Lundsgaarde argues,100 the way in which criminal justice actors
differentiate between lawful and unlawful violence stems from the custom
or culture within which such legal decisions are made, so too do "cultural"
images of what is a premeditated crime, what constitutes victim
provocation, and so on. The questions that need to be addressed in future
social science research, then, are what represents reliable indicators of these
variables and how can this data be systematically collected in future studies.
Traditionally, as noted above, data on these legal factors have been largely
absent from empirical research on the criminal justice process despite the
recognition that they play an integral role in the processing of violent crime.
There may be two related reasons for this absence. First, there is little
guidance about how we should measure these variables (i.e., should social
science indicators adhere to legal notions of what is meant by these factors
and, if not, what are some valid indicators that can be used by social
scientists). A second reason may stem from the number of obstacles often
faced when attempting to collect information about these variables,
including the amount of time required to collect detailed information for
individual cases. Whatever the reason, social science researchers need to
begin to search for more systematic ways to collect these data, not only
because of the legal relevance of these factors in determining punishment
for crimes, but because of the way in which these elements may have
become associated with common assumptions about interpersonal violence
that have yet to be supported by empirical research.




Indicator #1: The offender followed or laid in wait for an opportunity to
kill the victim.
The victim and offender had been married but were separated for some
time. The offender had previously threatened and pestered the victim and
her boarders. A restraining order was in effect, prohibiting the offender
from coming near the victim or telephoning her at home. Police were in the
process of investigating a breach of this order at the time of the killing. On
the morning of her death, as the victim left for work, the offender was
waiting outside her home with a gun. He chased her down and shot her in
front of several witnesses, mostly children waiting for a school bus. The
offender then turned the gun on himself. (Case 9113)
Indicator #2: The offender broke into the victim 's home.
The victim and the offender were married but separated about eighteen
months prior to the killing. The offender continually confronted, harassed
and threatened to kill the victim and was charged and convicted for his
actions. Later, the offender threatened to kill the victim's new partner, and
this threat was also reported to the police. The police were investigating
this incident at the time of killing. On the night of the incident, the victim
and her new common-law partner were asleep when the offender broke into
their home by shooting through the door. The offender entered the
bedroom and shot both the victim and her new partner. The offender's son
witnessed the shootings. The offender left a suicide note and a will. (Case
9203)
Indicator #3: The victim was sleeping when she was killed.
The victim and the offender were separated and in the process of
divorcing at the time of the homicide. The offender sometimes stayed at
the victim's home. On the night the victim was killed, the offender did not
stay the night, but entered the house unheard after the victim and her
children went to bed. He killed the victim while she was asleep. The
children ran into the victim's bedroom after they heard two shots. They
found both parents dead. (Case 7558)
101 As discussed supra note 97, these crime narratives illustrate how each indicator
demonstrates some degree of premeditation and/or intent. This is true despite that in each
case, the offender eventually commits suicide: a fact pattern that does not apply to the actual
cases analyzed in this study.
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Indicator #4: The offender made previous attempts or threats to kill the
victim.
In this case, both the victim and the offender died in a house fire. The
fire was extensive and destroyed everything, including their bodily remains.
Investigators determined that this was a homicide-suicide. The offender
killed the victim, set fire to the house, and then killed himself. Some family
members said the offender caught the victim with another man some time
before the incident and was obsessed about this event. He allegedly told a
friend he was going to end it all, take the victim with him and make sure
nobody got the house. Police reports indicate that friends and neighbors felt
the offender was an alcoholic, had a bad temper and physically abused the
victim in the past. The victim's mother saw bruises on the victim on
several previous occasions. (Case 8749)
Indicator #5: The offender brought a gun to the home or location of the
victim.
The victim and the offender had been separated for about nine months.
The victim was at a local bar with the second victim of the crime (a male).
The offender came into the bar and, shortly after, the victims left. They
drove a friend home and then the female victim drove her male friend to his
father's farm. The offender followed them there. When they stopped, the
offender walked up to the vehicle and ordered the victims out of the vehicle.
When they refused to get out, he shot them through the window. Two
hours later, he shot himself. The offender was reported to be both jealous
and possessive and had threatened to kill the female victim if he could not
have her. (Case 8243, see also scenario for Indicator #1)
Indicator #6: The offender purchased a gun or weapon immediately prior
to the killing.
The victim in this case had been missing for three days before her
body and that of the offender, her boyfriend, were found. She and her
boyfriend had gone on a picnic and failed to return. The boyfriend had
been depressed, having morbid thoughts and suicidal notions, primarily
because of school and family pressures. The victim had given notice to her
employer that she was quitting her job because she and her boyfriend were
to be married soon. The offender had purchased a gun two days before the




Indicator #7: The offender had written a suicide note indicating intent to
kill himself and the victim.
On the afternoon of the killing, the victim's ex-husband received a
message on his answering machine that his ex-wife was dead. The voice
was muffled, and he did not recognize who the caller was. At the same
time, the victim's daughter returned home and found a suicide note. Her
natural father, the victim's ex-huband, called while she was there, telling
her of the message he received and ordered her to leave the house
immediately. The offender, who was the second husband of the victim, had
left a note indicating that his decision to commit suicide was the result of
debts, bills and financial problems. He wrote that he had to kill his wife
because her health would suffer if he killed only himself. It was reported
that the offender had called the victim at work, told her he was having a
hernia attack (later determined to be non-existent), picked her up at work,
brought her home, shot her and then himself. (Case 8834)
Indicator #8: There were other indicators, not including the above, that
occurred only once or twice (such as changing a will, making funeral
arrangements, taking out a life insurance policy, or contracting out the
killing).
Witnesses claimed that the victim and the offender fought like "cats
and dogs." They were in the process of getting a divorce when the
homicide occurred. The offender had made several comments in the weeks
prior to the incident regarding "it being all over." He also saw a lawyer and
made a new will. The offender told a friend that there would be no court
case (with respect to divorce and/or property settlement), but only two pine
boxes. The offender strangled the victim with a vacuum cleaner cord and
then stabbed himself. The victim's son found her body. (Case 8538)
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